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REPLY TO "SIX DEGREES OF
DIALOGUE
'©
By PETER W. HOGG* AND ALLISON A. THORNTON"
In our article, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and
Legislatures,"1 we argued that it was helpful to think of judicial review as
part of a dialogue between the courts and the legislative bodies. We
argued that a judicial decision striking down a law on Charter2 grounds
nearly always left room for the law to be re-enacted by the competent
legislative body in a form that still accomplished the objectives of the
invalid law, and we presented evidence to show that most judicial
decisions striking down laws have been followed by legislative sequels.
The conclusion that we drew was that the constraints on the democratic
process that are imposed by judicial review are much less severe than is
often asserted by those who question the legitimacy of judicial review in
a democracy.
In "Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to Hogg and Bushell," 3
Christopher Manfredi and James Kelly offer a number of thoughtful
criticisms of our article. In this brief note, we set out each point of
criticism, and attempt to provide an answer.
1. We ignored those decisions in which the courts did not nullify a statute,
but merely nullified the action of a police officer or other official.
The reason why we focused on decisions that nullified statutes as
opposed to those that reviewed executive action flows from the question
that we posed near the beginning of our article, namely, whether the
© 1999, P.W. Hogg & A.A. Thornton.
* Dean and University Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
** Of the Bar of Ontario; Associate, Blake, Cassels & Graydon.
1 P.W. Hogg & A.A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or
Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All)" (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75
[hereinafter "Charter Dialogue"].
2 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
3 C.P. Manfredi & J.B. Kelly, "Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to Hogg and Bushell"
(1999) 37 Osgoode Hall LJ. 513 [hereinafter "Six Degrees of Dialogue"].
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Charter is a "bad thing" for democracy.4 Canadian courts have always
had the power to review executive action, albeit on more limited grounds
than are now available under the Charter. What is new under the
Charter, and what tends to upset ardent supporters of parliamentary
sovereignty, is the power of unelected judges to interfere with the
legislative decisions of elected representatives. Judicial decisions that do
not strike down a law do not, generally speaking, impugn legislative
choices, and do not raise concerns about judicial interference with
democratic processes.
While they are unusual, there are cases where the competent
legislative body is moved to alter the law by reason of a decision
condemning police action or administrative action. For example, as we
noted in our article, 5 the Supreme Court of Canada decided in R. v.
Duarte6 that electronic surveillance of suspects by undercover police
participants was a breach of section 8 of the Charter. This ill-considered
decision not only deprived the courts of reliable evidence, but it also put
police officers at risk since they could not wear electronic body packs
even for protection. Parliament quickly acted to enact a code authorizing
and regulating state-initiated participant electronic surveillance.
7
Another example (which comes from outside our time frame) is the case
of R. v. Feeney,8 where the Supreme Court held that a police officer who
held a warrant for the arrest of a murder suspect, and who suspected on
reasonable grounds that the suspect was in his unlocked home, violated
section 8 of the Charter when he peacefully entered the home and made
the arrest. Parliament quickly enacted an amendment 9 to the Criminal
Code making provision for such a warrant, but also authorizing entry
without warrant where "by reason of exigent circumstances it would be
impracticable to obtain a warrant."1o
The decisions and legislative sequels to both Duarte and Feeney
4 See "Charter Dialogue," supra note I at 76-82.
5 Ibid. at 89.
6 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 [hereinafter Duarte]. This decision was followed in R. v. Wiggins, [1990] 1
S.C.R. 62; andR. v. Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36.
7 See An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act and the
Radiocommunication Act, S.C. 1993, c. 40, s. 4, which added sections 184.1-184.6 to the Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
8 [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13 [hereinafter Feeney].
9 See An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Interpretation Act (powers to arrest and enter
dwellings), S.C. 1997, c. 39, s. 2, which added sections 529-529.5 to the Criminal Code, supra note 7.
10 Criminal Code, supra note 7, s. 529.3(1).
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are excellent examples of dialogue, because in each case a judicial
decision led to the enactment of a law to regulate the action of police
officers, and the law tried to strike a fair balance between the civil
liberties of the suspect (as identified by the Court) and the exigencies of
police enforcement. Our focus on legislative nullifications led us to
include in our data only those cases where a law was struck down. We
could have hunted for and recorded all the cases where the striking
down of police (or other executive) action led to legislative sequels.
However, it should be noticed that this research would strengthen our
thesis rather than weaken it, because the research would reveal that
dialogue is more extensive than indicated by a focus on legislative
sequels to judicial nullification of statutes.
2. We may have missed some non-Supreme Court decisions where laws
were struck down, thereby potentially biasing the study and making it
"impossible to draw any meaningful conclusions about Charter dialogue. "M
We selected for study all of the decisions of the Supreme Court
of Canada in which a law had been struck down on Charter grounds.
Needless to say, the attorney general of any particular jurisdiction will
normally appeal any decision striking down a law all the way up to the
Supreme Court, so that there are few nullifications of laws that end at a
lower court. There are, however, some of these, and so we added them
to the study. We assumed that we had all the important ones by using all
the cases cited in Constitutional Law of Canada.72 It is true that, while
Peter Hogg's text purports to track all the important developments in
constitutional law, it is not infallible, and our research would have been
more exhaustive if we had hunted for any cases that Hogg had somehow
missed in his text. Manfredi and Kelly do not claim that there are any
such cases, and so the point seems to be quite trivial. It is perhaps worth
pointing out that our thesis depends not at all on having precise figures
of every instance or non-instance of Charter dialogue-the mere fact that
many decisions have legislative sequels establishes the empirical part of
the thesis.
11 "Six Degrees of Dialogue," supra note 3 at 517.
12 P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997).
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3. We wrongly included cases where the legislative sequel was enacted
before the case reached the Supreme Court of Canada.
There is no merit to this criticism. Where the competent
legislative body acts on the basis of a lower court decision, it is equally an
example of dialogue. Manfredi and Kelly have confused "dialogue," as
we defined it, with other (equally valid) definitions of dialogue that have
been suggested by others. Our article was not about "the Supreme
Court's willingness to engage in an institutional dialogue with the other
branches of government,"13 as Manfredi and Kelly assert. Our article
was about the extensive ability of legislative bodies to respond to decisions
striking down laws by courts of any level. Where the legislative body acts
on the basis of a lower court decision before the case moves on to the
Supreme Court, it is equally an example of dialogue.
We cannot take credit for the idea of the Supreme Court self-
consciously engaging the legislatures in dialogue when rendering Charter
decisions. That form of dialogue could perhaps be more correctly
attributed to opinions by members of the Court in several cases that
have been released since our article was published.1 4
4. We exaggerated the number of legislative sequels by counting cases where
a single legislative sequel dealt with more than one case.
We must acknowledge the fact that, if one were to treat as a
single instance of dialogue those cases that stood for the same
proposition and generated the same legislative response, there would be
a modest reduction in our sample size, from 65 cases to 60 cases.
However, Manfredi and Kelly go too far when they suggest that the
replacement of several sections of the Narcotic Control Act5 with new
provisions of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 16 constitutes only a
single instance of dialogue. The sections of the Narcotic ControlAct were
struck down in several cases for a variety of reasons, and the legislative
sequel involved the replacement of the entire Act. Is it only one example
13 "Six Degrees of Dialogue," supra note 3 at 517 [emphasis in original].
14 See, for example, lacobucci J. in Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 at 565-66, 578
[hereinafter Vriend]; Bastarache J. in M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 at 181-83; L'Heureux-Dub6 J. in
Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 at 283-85; and
McLachlin and lacobucci JJ. in R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68 at paras. 57-60, online: QL (SCJ).
15 R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1.
16 S.C. 1996, c. 19.
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of dialogue when a legislative sequel deals with various different issues
in a single enactment? We do not think so.
With respect, it is a mistake to focus too intently on the specific
number of cases and legislative sequels. The question of what to count is.
always open to argument. Consider the following examples. First, as we
have already mentioned, there are cases where a decision striking down
executive action is followed by a legislative sequel. Second, it is not
uncommon for several jurisdictions, in addition to the one directly
affected, to enact changes to legislation in response to a successful
Charter challenge. Third, there are examples of legislative responses to
unsuccessful Charter challenges, such as Thibaudeau v. Canada,17 that
led to changes in the taxation of child support payments.18 Fourth, in
some cases-Vriend 9 is a good example-where no legislative sequel
follows, what appears to be inaction is the result of a lively political
debate over how to respond to a judicial decision. Although we
mentioned these kinds of legislative responses to judicial decisions in our
article, we did not put them into our data. In short, while our counting
methods are open to criticism, they do not exaggerate the prevalence of
dialogue.
5. We also exaggerate the prevalence of dialogue by including cases where
the legislative sequels are "major legislative responses on the part of elected
officials, such as repealing sections or replacing entire Acts. "
20
We do not accept the proposition that, if a constitutional defect
exposed by a judicial decision is corrected as part of a wider legislative
reform, it does not count as an example of dialogue. For example, as
noted above, a variety of constitutional infirmities in the old Narcotic
Control Act were corrected in a new Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
Similarly, the old Tobacco Products ControlAct,21 which was held to be a
violation of freedom of expression, was replaced by a new Tobacco Act,
17 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627; cited in "Charter Dialogue," supra note 1 at 104-05.
18 See Income Tax Budget Amendments Act, 1996, S.C. 1997, c. 25.
19 Supra note 14. Vriend was followed by a public debate and an explicit decision by the
Government of Alberta not to use section 33 to override the judicial decision, which read in sexual
orientation as a ground of discrimination into Alberta's human rights legislation.
20 "Six Degrees of Dialogue," supra note 3 at 521.
21 R.S.C. 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 14.
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with more carefully targeted prohibitions of advertising.22 Manfredi and
Kelly say that these cannot be counted at all because they are not
examples of a "positive" dialogue. We say, why not? Whenever a
legislative response follows a Charter nullification ruling, it is reasonable
to assume that the legislature has given consideration to the range of
constitutionally permissible options left open by the ruling.
6. We do not answer the critique of democratic legitimacy, because "policy
distortion" occurs "whenever a legislature must subordinate its
understanding of constitutionally permissible policy to that articulated by a
court. "2 3
We probably should not have said in the conclusion to our article
that "the critique of the Charter based on democratic legitimacy cannot
be sustained." 24 No amount of argument or evidence will shake the
convictions of those who regard any influence by the courts on legislative
policymaking as illegitimate "policy distortion." But that is an extreme
position. When legislative bodies follow judicial interpretations of the
Charter to enact laws that require search warrants for searches, that
eliminate provisions that cast the burden of proof on the accused, that
require mens rea for serious criminal offences, that introduce standards
for censorship of movies, that make provision for absentee voting, and
that permit limited forms of advertising by dentists-to use a few
examples from our survey of sequels-no major democratic objective is
defeated at the same time that a civil libertarian value is respected. The
Charter, admittedly as interpreted by the courts, forces the legislative
bodies to pay more attention to the liberty of the individual and to show
more respect for minorities than the majority's representatives in the
legislature are likely to do in the absence of judicial review.
Our point is that judicially-imposed constitutional norms rarely
defeat a desired legislative policy; they generally operate at the margins
of legislative policy, affecting issues of process, enforcement, and
standards, all of which can accommodate most legislative objectives.
22 S.C. 1997, c. 13, ss. 18-33 (Part IV).
23 "Six Degrees of Dialogue," supra note 3 at 522.
24 "Charter Dialogue," supra note 1 at 105. We are much more moderate, at 80, where we
acknowledge that the Court may have forced issues onto the legislative agenda that the legislature
would have preferred not to have to deal with, and that the Court may have influenced the text of
the new law by requiring greater weight to be given to Charter values.
[VOL 37 No. 3
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7. Because the Supreme Court of Canada has several times gone on to
decide a constitutional issue after the legislative sequel has been enacted,
this shows that the judges are not particularly interested in "engaging in a
dialogue about constitutional norms. "25
This point reflects the fallacy identified earlier that attributes to
us the assumption that courts want to engage in a dialogue. What they
want to do is decide cases. A legislative sequel is nearly always
prospective in its operation, having no effect on past cases, including
cases in the judicial system. The parties to those cases will reasonably
want their rights to be determined according to the law as it stood when
the facts occurred. Some appeals go to the Supreme Court as of right;
they have to be decided whether or not new legislation has been enacted.
But, even for those appeals that require leave, if there is concern that an
appellant has suffered an injustice on an important constitutional point,
it may be a reasonable choice for the Court to accept the appeal even if
new legislation has altered the law for the future.
8. We assume "a judicial monopoly on correct interpretation" of the
Charter.26
We do not. All we say is that the decisions of courts, whether right
or wrong, rarely preclude a legislative sequel and usually get one. As an
aside, we note that many of the decisions that led to legislative sequels
were vigorously criticized as wrongly decided in Hogg's Constitutional
Law of Canada.27 However, Hogg's developing understanding of the
concept of dialogue has caused him to repent of some7 of his more
categorical condemnations on the ground that the decisions that he
criticized have sometimes resulted in legislation that he is forced to
acknowledge constitutes a major improvement of the law.28
25 "Six Degrees of Dialogue," supra note 3 at 522.
2 6 Ibid. at 523.
2 7 Supra note 12.
28 A good example is the legislation that followed the Duarte decision: see notes 5-7, supra.
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9. We inflate the data by including as examples of "dialogue" legislative
sequels that simply give effect to the judicial decision. These kinds of sequels
should not be counted, because they reinforce the "hierarchical relationship
between judges and legislators" by allowing "the judiciary's interpretation of
the Charter to go unchallenged. "29
It is an arguable point that there is no dialogue when a
legislature responds to a judicial decision by doing exactly what the court
orders. But, remembering that the legislature nearly always has a range
of choice, it is difficult to maintain that the legislature is not exercising
any of that choice when it implements the court's decision. After all, in
common experience, dialogue does sometimes lead to agreement. We
have not researched the debates within government that preceded each
legislative sequel, but we consider it safe to assume that in most if not all
cases a range of legislative sequels would have been under consideration.
10. Charter dialogue is "far more complex and less extensive" than we
reported.30
This is the conclusion of "Six Degrees of Dialogue." Manfredi
and Kelly do shed interesting light on what is without question a
complex phenomenon. However, it will be obvious from the foregoing
account that we do not accept many of the distinctions relied on by them
to exclude legislative sequels from consideration as dialogue, and we
certainly do not agree that Charter dialogue is "less extensive" than we
reported.
29 "Six Degrees of Dialogue," supra note 3 at 525.
3 0 IbicL at 524-25.
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